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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEAN ALLEN and GIFFORD ALLEN, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs-
RADIUM KING MINES, INC., a Colo-
rado Corporation; ULA URANIUM, INC., 
a Colorado Corporation, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
9194 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Consistent with the brief of the appellants, the 
appellants Dean Allen and Gifford Allen will be referred 
to as plaintiffs as they appeared in the trial court. The 
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2 
respondents Radium King Mines; Ula Uranium, et al. 
will be referred to as the defendants as they appear in the 
court below. The transcript of the proceedings at the 
trial will be referred to as (T. ______ ). The record on appeal 
will be referred to as (R. ------)· 
The dispute concerns the validity of conflicting lode 
mining claims covering land in San Juan County, Utah. 
The area in conflict is covered by Fat Dog claims belong-
ing to Radium King and Hi Boy claims belonging to the 
plaintiffs. Ula has heretofore conveyed to Radium King 
all of the former's operating interest in the said Fat 
Dog claims subject to a one-half interest in the net 
profits. The parties agree that the land involved was 
open for mineral location at the time the conflicting 
claims were allegedly located. Specifically the conflict 
involves Fat Dog claims Nos. 4, 5, 6, and Fat Dog frac-
tions Nos. 2 and 3 on the one hand, and Hi Boy claims 
Nos. 1, 2, and 3 on the other hand. 
According to the location notices for the Fat Dog 
claims Nos. 4, 5, and 6, the same were staked on the 
ground May 17-19, 1954, and on June 17, 1954, the loca-
tion notices for the said claims were filed in the office 
of the County Recorder for San Juan County. 
According to the location notices for the Hi Boy 
claims Nos. 1, 2, and 3, the same were staked on the 
ground February 23, 1956, and on March 15, 1956, the 
same were filed in the office of the County Recorder 
for San Juan County. 
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On May 9, 1956, Fat Dog claims Nos. 1 to 7 inclusive 
were amended on the ground, and on said date Fat Dog 
fractions Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were located. On May 10, 1956, 
the amended location notices for Fat Dog claims Nos. 
1 to 7 inclusive and location notices for Fat Dog fraction-
al claims Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were filed in the office of the 
County Recorder for San Juan County. 
An affidavit filed August 26, 1957, in the office of 
the County Recorder of San Juan County stated that the 
amended location of Fat Dog No. 6 was in fact an original 
location. 
On January 14, 1959, Hi Boy claims Nos. 1, 2, and 3 
were amended on the ground and on January 19, 1959, 
amended notices of location of the said Hi Boy claims 
were filed in the office of the County Recorder of San 
Juan County. 
The notice of location for Hi Boy claim No. 1 placed 
in the discovery monument of said claim did not contain 
the names of the locators. 
In his opening statement, counsel for the plaintiffs 
stated that the plaintiffs claimed the land in conflict by 
virtue of their actual physical possession of the same 
(T. 4). During the course of the trial, however, there was 
no evidence whatsoever introduced by the plaintiffs indi-
cating that they ever at any time had, on the contrary, 
actual physical possession of the ground in conflict. The 
evidence showed that it was Radium King Mines that 
was in possession ( T. 378-380). 
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The plaintiffs on August 23, 1957, attempted to go 
on the disputed ground, but the defendants who were 
then in possession of the claims prevented the plaintiffs 
from so doing (T. 378-380). 
Other facts which have a bearing on the issues in-
volved are set forth in the argument. 
PRELIMINARY STATE~IENT 
In this action both the plaintiffs and the defendants 
are seeking to quiet title to land covered by conflicting 
mining claims (R. 1-5, 27-33). The action, therefore, is 
one at law. Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah (2d) 11, 327 P. 
(2d) 250; Babcock v. DangerfVeld, 98 Utah 10, 94 P. (2d) 
862; Buckley v. Cox, 122 Utah 151, 247 P. (2d) 277. It 
therefore follows that this appeal shall be on questions 
of law only, and the Supreme Court is bound by the find-
ings of the trial court if there is any competent evidence 
to support them. See Rule 72, Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, and Buckley v. Cox, 122 Utah 151, 247 P. (2d) 277. 
This latter case involved an appeal from a lower court 
judgment quieting title to certain property in the plain-
tiff. There defendants' sole assignment of error on ap-
peal was that the evidence was insufficient to support 
the finding of the trial court. This court speaking 
through Mr. Justice :McDonough repeated the criteria for 
determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the findings in a quiet title action. 
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"Under the criteria set out in Nor back v. Board 
of Directors, 84 Utah 506, 37 P.2d 339, this action 
is one at law. Hence if there is any competent 
evidence in the record to support the court's find-
ings the judgment should not be disturbed. Brown 
v. Union Pac. R. Co., 76 Utah 475, 290 P. 759; 
Jenkins v. Stephens, 64 Utah 307, 231 P. 112. This 
principle is well stated in Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 
Utah 481, 39 P.2d 1070, 1072: 
"'As this is a law action, the question is not 
whether the evidence would have supported 
the decision in favor of the appellants, but 
whether the decision made by the trial court 
finds support in the evidence. If there is 
competent credible evidence to support the 
findings made by the trial court, then those 
findings should stand.' " 
The same results would obtain even if this were an 
ejectment action as claimed by the plaintiffs on page 8 
of their brief. Robinson v. Thomas, 75 Utah 446, 453, 286 
P. 625. 
In any event, however, the findings of the trial court 
are overwhelmingly supported in the record of the case. 
Contrary to the statement of the plaintiffs on page 8 
of their brief this quiet title suit is precisely the situation 
where the plaintiffs must rely on the strength of their 
own title rather than on any weakness of the defendants' 
title. 
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74 C.J.S., Quieting Title, Sec.17(b): 
"As a general rule, one seeking to quiet title or 
remove a cloud thereon must succeed on the 
strength of his own title and not on the weakness 
of his adversary's title, and want of title in plain-
tiff ordinarily renders it unnecessary to examine 
that of defendant." 
Babcock v. Dangerfield, 98 Utah 10, 94 P. (2d) 862: 
"While it is true that in an action to quiet title 
the plaintiff must succeed by virtue of the 
strength of his own title rather than the weakness 
of defendant's title, nevertheless all the plaintiff 
need do is to prove prima facie that he has title 
which, if not overcome by defendant, is sufficient." 
(Gases cited) 
Likewise see the case of Honte Owners' Loan Co"fpo-
ration v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 141 P. (2d) 160, a quiet 
title action. The court said: 
"Plaintiff could prevail on a claim of record 
title only by showing good title in itself, not by 
showing some defects in the title of defendant." 
Also see Kanab Urantum Corp. v. Consolidated 
Uranium Mines, 227 F. (2d) 434 (C.C.A.-10, 1955) 
". . . it is the law without exception that in all 
actions to recover possession of land or an inter-
est therein one must prevail upon the strength of 
his own title and not on the weakness of his ad-
versary's title." ('Cases cited.) 
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POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NEVER HAD ANY POSSES-
SION OF THE DISPUTED PREMISES-LAWFUL, PEACE-
FUL, OR OTHERWISE. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFFS' HI BOY CLAIMS ARE INVALID AND 
ARE INFERIOR TO ANY CLAIMS OF DEFENDANTS. 
(A) FINDING NO. 14 IS ADEQUA'TELY SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
(B) FINDING NO. 13 IS ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT III. 
THE FAT DOG CLAIMS WERE VALIDLY LOCATED 
PRIOR IN TIME TO ANY HI BOY CLAIMS AND THE 
PLAINTIFFS ARE IN NO ·POSITION 'TO ATTACK THE 
VALIDITY OF THE FAT DOG FRACTIONAL CLAIMS NOS. 
2 AND 3 AND FAT DOG NO.6 CLAIM. 
POINT IV. 
OTHER DEFECTS IN THE ATTEMPTED LOCATION 
OF THE HI BOY CLAIMS. 
(A) THE DISCOVERY MONUMENTS ERECTED FOR 
THE HI BOY CLAIMS WERE INVALID. 
(B) THE LOCA'TION NOTICES COVERING THE HI 
BOY CLAIMS FILED FOR RECORD IN THE 
OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF SAN 
JUAN COUNTY ARE INVALID. 
(C) THE LOCATORS OF THE HI BOY CLAIMS 
NEVER MADE A DISCOVERY OF MINERAL 
IN PLACE ON THE PREMISES COVERED BY 
THE SAID CLAIMS. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NEVER HAD ANY POSSES-
SION OF THE DISPUTED PREMISES-LAWFUL, PEACE-
FUL, OR OTHERWISE. 
The claim on the part of the plaintiffs on page 9 
of their brief that they were in "continuous, notorious 
possession of the property in August of 1957, the month 
in which they were ousted, and in the month preceding" 
is simply not true. Such a claim has no basis whatsoever 
in the record. The plaintiffs say that possession cannot 
be questioned and cite the following pages on page 9 
of their brief (T. 35-38, 145-147, 175). The court's at-
tention is invited to all of the testimony appearing on 
those pages and in addition the testimony on pages 178 
and 179 where it is at once evident that the plaintiffs 
were entirely out of possession of the disputed premises. 
The testimony on pages 35, 36 and 37 of the trans-
cript indicates only that the Aliens were making some 
arrangements for work to be done in the area; they dealt 
with one Allenbach (T. 36); they only camped close to 
the property ( T. 36) ; while they went on the Hi Boy 
claims (T. 37), nothing indicates where on the claims 
they went. Allen said an engineer was on the ground 
and used instruments (T. 37). A bulldozer was headed 
for the area (T. 38). A road was started up the mountain 
towards the claim (T. 38). But certainly none of the 
foregoing testimony indicates any possession on the part 
of the Aliens. At most the testimony only suggested the 
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anticipations of the plaintiffs. As a matter of fact the 
plaintiffs' bulldozer was stopped by Radium King when 
it approached the Fat Dog claims (T. 40). Radium King, 
not the Aliens was in possession! Radium King in de-
fense of its title and possession wouldn't let the Aliens 
trespass on the property. If the court has any doubt 
about who was in possession it is invited to look at pages 
39, 40, 41, and 42 of the transcript. 
The camp of the Allenbachs, with which persons 
the plaintiffs had had some dealings and through whom 
the plaintiffs apparently claim to be in possession of the 
area in conflict, were never on the claims. Dean Allen on 
cross-examination admitted that they, the Allenbachs, 
only camped close to the premises ( T. 77). When pressed 
further he admitted they were camping more than a half 
mile away (T. 95). On further cross-examination he 
stated that the plaintiffs never got any equipment on the 
Hi Boy claims at all (T. 94). The only equipment on 
the claims was that which would have been carried per-
sonally by the plaintiffs in their pockets or in their packs 
(T. 94). The plaintiffs never had a camp site or put a 
camp down on the claims (T. 94). 
Both Duncan E. Harrison and Arthur E. Flint testi-
fied as to the work and labor being done by Radium King 
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on and for the benefit of the premises in conflict. Harri-
son indicated the extent of the Radium King activity on 
the claims (R. 376-377). Flint in his testimony ampli-
fied the statements of Harrison and pointed out the ex-
tent to which Radium King men and equipment were on 
the Fat Dog claims (R. 407-409). 
The plaintiffs made some point of an incident that 
occurred on the Fat Dog claims when the defendant, 
Radium King, prevented the plaintiffs from moving onto 
the Fat Dog claims ( T. 178). This only bears out the 
contention of Radium King that it was Radium King, not 
the Aliens, that was in possession of the ground in dis-
pute. Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention the Aliens 
were out of possession. They were prevented from tres-
passing on the Fat Dog claims. 
The whole situation appears to be a design on the 
part of the plaintiffs to claim ground already occupied by 
defendants, after guessing that the ground lies on the 
extension of a channel on which Radium King presently 
has a producing mine. Radium King has spent $25,000.00 
for the benefit of the ground in question (T. 4-7); has 
actually drilled it. The plaintiffs haven't spent anything 
except a little time and the cost of a couple of surveys, 
the first of which was objectionable to the plaintiffs 
and was not finished. 
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Certainly fron1 the foregoing evidence the trial court 
was justified in failing to find that the plaintiffs were 
in possession of the disputed area under such circum-
stances as to give them a claim to the same. 
We have read the five cases cited by the plaintiffs 
on this issue. None contain facts similar to the instant 
case to the extent there is any factual resemblance. They 
only strengthen the position of Radium King Mines 
rather than help the Aliens. We have no quarrel with 
the law as stated in any of the cited cases. 
In the case of Ather ley v. Bulli1on M anarch Uranium 
Company, 8 Utah (2d) 362, 335 P. (2d) 71, there was 
no dispute about possession. The plaintiff knew at the 
time he located his claim that the defendant was in 
posession of the area in dispute through its lessee and 
was and had been conducting mining operations thereon 
for a few years previously. Nearly all of the mining 
operations on the particular claim involved were con-
ducted on the area in conflict. Over a three year period 
there had been removed some 10,000 tons of ore from 
the area that was in dispute. It was estimated that 
some $300,000.00 had been expended by the defendant, 
its lessee and contractors developing the conflict area. 
In that case this court noted : 
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"The only issue on this appeal is whether 
or not a mining locator, with full knowledge of 
the claim of a prior claimant, 1nay deliberately 
stake over the boundaries of said prior claimant 
while the latter is in possession and mining the 
property claimed, and assert the invalidity of 
the prior claim, on the sole ground that a few 
years before the prior claimant had relocated his 
claim without filing of record an amended loca-
tion certificate." 
Eilers v. Boatman, 3 Utah 159, 167, 2 P. 66, 72, 
affirmed 111 U. S. 356, 357, 4 S. Ct. 432, 28 L. Ed. 
454, unlike the instant case, involved a secret under-
ground trespass by a third party which the court held 
did not effect the rights of either party to the action 
and as between the litigants, it was an undisputed fact 
that the respondents were in actual possession of the 
area in dispute, sinking their incline shaft and occupy-
ing a shanty on the ground. 
Inman v. Ollson, 321 P. (2d) 1043 (Ore. 1958) in-
volved an action by the plaintiffs to eject the defendants 
as trespassers on four mining locations made by the 
plaintiffs. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' evidence, 
the trial court granted an involuntary non-suit. The 
plaintiffs had gone on the ground in question and had 
staked out four mining claims and posted notices as 
required by law, and thereafter in compliance with 
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the applicable statutory provisions, they established the 
boundaries of the claims on the ground. In the meantime 
efforts were made to have discovery work completed. 
Also in the meantime the defendant came upon the 
premises and overstaked the claims of the plaintiffs 
and claimed the land in dispute and posted signs warn-
ing trespassers that they would be prosecuted. Held: 
Unless abandoned prior to the expiration of the 60-day 
period, there could be no valid relocation of the same 
ground made by any third parties during the inter-
vening 60-day period. Whether the plaintiffs had validly 
located the claim was a question of fact for the jury 
to consider. 
Kanab Uranium Corp. v. Consolvdated u~anium 
Mines, 227 F. (2d) 434 (C.C.A.-10, 1955) is also cited 
by the plaintiffs. There the plaintiffs were oil and gas 
lease owners who did not have any title to mining 
claims and claimed the right as general citizens to 
go upon the land occupied by the defendants under 
color of title and there explore for uranium. The plain-
tiffs sought to have the defendants restrained from 
interfering with their so going upon the claims, alleging 
that the right of possession and title of the defendants 
to their mining claims were in fact void. In holding 
that the complaint was properly dismissed by the trial 
court, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit said: 
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"It seems clear from the face of the com-
plaint that appellee was in possession of the 
premises under color of title, of which fact ap-
pellants had full knowledge, and the title was 
being asserted by appellee in defense of its po 
session. 
"It follows, therefore, that since appellants 
have no title to a mining claim and assert only 
the right to go upon the premises . to explore 
for minerals they are in no position to attack 
the validity of appellee's title to its mining claims, 
because it is the law without exception that in 
all actions to recover possession of land or an 
interest therein one must prevail upon the 
strength of his own title and not on the weakness 
of his adversary's title. 
"While some of the cases say that possession 
may be maintained only by 'continued actual 
occupancy by a qualified locator or his repre-
sentatives engaged in persistent and diligent 
prosecution of work looking to the discovery of 
mineral,' they hold that 'As against a mere in-
truder, the possession of a mining claim by a 
locator who has complied with the law is of it-
self sufficient to prevent the intruder, even upon 
a peaceable entry, from acquiring a right of 
possession.' The right as general citizens which 
appellants assert to go upon premises occupied 
by another under color of title, even though 
defective, is not right of title entitling them 
to maintain this action." 
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The Aliens in the instant case are 1n much the 
same position as the appellants in the Kanab Uranium 
case. The predecessors in title of Radium King Mines 
were the prior locators of the claims. Radium King 
was, in fact, in possession of the disputed ground and 
prevented the plaintiffs from trespassing thereon. 
The weakness of the plaintiffs' title in the instant 
case was so obvious that it is understandable why the 
plaintiffs in their brief would seek to havP ~!1~:::1 cuu1 t 
believe that in spite of that weakness, they can recover 
on some nebulous theory of possession or right of 
possession. Kanab Uranium, however, makes it clear 
that the Aliens must recover on the strength of their 
own title and the facts show that they had neither 
pos~P.Rsion nor title by which they could prevail in this 
action. 
In Adams v. Benedict, 327 P. (2d) · 308 (New 
Mexico, 1958) the plaintiffs had marked the location 
of their claims, posted notices thereon, and filed copies 
with the county clerk, but had not drilled a discovery 
hole exposing mineral in place within ninety days as 
required by statute. At the time the defendants entered 
the disputed ground, the plaintiffs were not and had 
not been engaged in persistent and diligent prosecution 
of work looking to the discovery of mineral, nor had 
they been in actual, continued possession of the ground. 
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The defendants entered peaceably upon the ground in 
question and took actual possession thereof. They moved 
a large drilling rig onto the premises; thereafter the 
plaintiffs forceably entered upon the premises against 
vigorous opposition. On such facts the New Mexico Court 
reached the only logical conclusion that could be reached 
- that the plaintiffs had not perfected their claim 
and had no rights in the purported location, and the 
defendants having peaceably entered upon the ground 
and taken actual possession thereof were entitled to a 
possessory right of the claim in question. The distinction 
between the instant case and Adams vs. Benedict as 
far as the plaintiffs are concerned is obvious. It is 
the plaintiffs' position and not the defendants' position 
in Adams vs. Benedict that corresponds to the position 
of the plaintiffs in the instant case. 
One thing is clear in the case at bar and that is 
that it was Radium King Mines, and not the Allen 
brothers, that was in actual possession of the disputed 
premises. The Allen brothers were out of possession. 
They were denied entry upon the claims. Neither were 
they forceably dispossessed. Therefore, the Allen broth-
ers, being out of possession, if they are to prevail in 
this case, must show under smne valid title of their 
own, a right to the possession of the claims. This they 
did not do. The evidence introduced at the trial of the 
case and noted above demonstrates that Radium King 
Mines and its predecessors in title were the original 
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locators of the claims. The Fat Dog claims were located 
in the months of May and June of 1954. The over-
lapping Hi Boy claims were not staked, if they were 
ever staked on the ground, until 1956. In other words, 
Radium King Mines and its predecessors in title were 
the prior locators of the ground; had made a valid 
discovery th~reon and were in actu~ possession of 
the claims. Nearly $25,000.00 have been spent in de-
velopment work by the defendants ( 407). This is simply 
a case of the plaintiffs who were subsequent in time 
and out of possession looking for some way to muscle 
in on the defendants. 
There was certainly sufficient evidence to justify 
the trial court in finding : 
"The Fat Dog claims have been rn the 
defendants' and their predecessor in interest 
possession since their original location. (Mem-
orandum Decision, R. 55) 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFFS' HI BOY CLAIMS ARE INVALID AND 
ARE INFERIOR TO ANY CLAIMS OF DEFENDANTS. 
(A) FINDING NO~ 14 IS ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
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Finding No. 14 made by trial court reads as follows 
(R. 59): 
"14. The boundaries of said Hi Boy claims, 
Nos. 1, 2, and 3, were not distinctly marked on 
the ground so that the boundaries could readily 
be traced." 
Section 40-1-3 U.C.A. 1953, provides as follows: 
"Mining claims and mill sites must be dis-
tinctly marked on the ground so that the bound-
aries thereof can be readily traced." 
Not until the time of trial were the defendants able 
to determine precisely what ground the plaintiffs claim 
we-re included in their Hi Boy claiins. When John 
Shepherd surveyed the area in May, 1956, he observed 
several scattered Hi Boy monuments which were lo-
cated on the plat later prepared from his survey notes. 
(See defendants' Exhibit No. 10.) On his plat he showed 
the Fat Dog and Fat Dog fractional claims. He also 
showed the Hi Boy monuments that he observed. 
From the Hi Boy corners he observed during his 
survey, it is quite obvious that the boundaries of the 
Hi Boy claims could not readily be traced, as required 
by Section 40-1-3 U.C.A., 1953. For instance, two South-
east corner monuments for Hi Boy No. 3 are noted in 
the vicinity of Fat Dog No. 6. Similarly one can observe 
two Northeast corner monuments for Hi Boy No. 2 
claim. In one case the Southeast corner of Hi Boy No. 3 
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is common to the Northeast corner of Hi Boy No. 2. 
In the other case it is not. (Exhibit 10) 
Connecting the respective corners with dotted lines 
as shown on Shepherd's plat, Exhibit No. 10, it appears 
that the Hi Boy Nos. 2 and 3 claims were nearly per-
pendicular to the Wingate scarp or cliff. Then com-
plete'Iy inconsistent with any location lying perpendicular 
to the Wingate escarpment, J\fr. Shepherd, in the course 
of his survey, found other Hi Boy corners on the 
Fat Dog No. 3 claim. He found a Southwest corner 
and Northeast corner of Hi Boy No. 1 claim. However, 
up towards the top of defendants' Exhibit 10 is shown 
the Northeast corner of Hi Boy No. 1 claim, and in 
the latter case it is common to the Southwest corner 
of Hi Boy No. 2. 
How can anyone be expected to trace any Hi Boy 
claims readily from such monuments~ There appears 
to be a floating or swinging of the Hi Boy claims. It 
would appear that if the claims were ever located on 
the ground, they were first located perpendicular to 
the wingate scarp and then later floated or rotated 
nearly 90°. North of the upper end of Fat Dog No. 5 
can be observed a NW corner of Hi Boy No.1 common 
to the SW corner of Hi Boy· No. 2. Near by is to be 
observed the west and center of Hi Boy No. 1, the 
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source being common to the SE corner of Hi Boy No. 
6. But look in the Fat Dog No. 3 claims and what do 
you see~ The NW corner of Hi Boy No. 1, west and 
center of Hi Boy No. 1 and SW corner of Hi Boy No. 1, 
and none of the latter corners are common to Hi Boy 
6 corner. How could the defendants or anyone else be 
expected to trace the boundaries of Hi Boy claims 1 
Up until 1956 there was no sign of a Hi Boy claim 
in the area, then Hi Boy corners suddenly began to 
appear all over the area occupied by the Fat Dog claims. 
Then just before trial the plaintiffs came up with 
"L" shaped claims as shown in red tracing on Exhibit 
No. 10. Such a contention on the part of plaintiffs is 
novel to say the least. Surely such a contention should 
tax the credulity of this or any other court. The lo-
cation notices for the Hi Boy claims, Exhibits D, E, 
and F clearly show that there was no intention what-
soever to locate any "L"-shaped claim. The dimensions 
set forth in the notices are such that the claims, if they 
corresponded at all to the description set forth in 
the notice, would have to be in the shape of a rec-
tangle or parallelogram. There are no indications at 
all of any angular side lines. 
During the course of preparing for trial and pur-
suant to the demand of defendants the plaintiffs pro-
duced Exhibit No. 17. The claims shown in the upper 
left hand portion of Exhibit 17 show the Fat Dog and 
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Hi Boy claims. Note that the Hi Boy claims are shown 
to lie in an east and west direction. The east-west direc-
tion corresponds to their lower position of the Hi Boy 
claim shown in Exhibit No. 10. At least the east west 
position of the Hi Boy corresponds to the claims as shown 
on defendants' Exhibit No. 12 which was introduced at 
the deposition of Dean Allen as Exhibit "B." An exam-
ination of Exhibit No. 12 shows the Hi Boy claims in 
rectangular manner cutting across the Fat Dog claims. 
The relative position of Fat Dog and Hi Boy claims were 
claimed by Gifford Allen to be as shown on Exhibit No. 
12. 
In addition, Nate Knight, who was to fly the claims 
was given a rough sketch of the same by the Aliens, and 
their relationship to the Wingate scarp is shown on de-
fendants' Exhibit No. 18. The pencil sketch was prepared 
at the deposition of Nate Knight and there introduced as 
defendants' Exhibit No. 1. 
In none of the discovery proceedings prior to trial, 
nor in any of the dealings between the parties was it 
ever indicated to the defendants that the plaintiffs con-
tended that their claims were "L" -shaped. Paul Allen 
in testifying at the trial seemed to suggest that at the 
time the depositions were taken in December, 1959, he 
knew the claims were "L"-shaped (T. 255). Suffice it 
to say, that if he and his brothers did then know the 
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claims were "L" -shaped, they kept the information well 
concealed. It is doubtful that the Hi Boy claims were 
ever actually located on the ground as early as 1956. 
When corners were placed on the ground either the plain-
tiffs didn't know what they were doing or they were at-
tempting to swing or float the claims as appear from the 
corners surveyed in by John Shepherd. From the time 
of the deposition in December, 1956 to just before trial 
it appeared the plaintiffs had settled on an east-west 
position for their claims. See Exhibit No. 12. Now they 
are "L" -shaped. The plaintiffs cannot reconcile this with 
the statutory requirement of Section 40-1-3. The whole 
purpose of stating a claim is to let it be known exactly 
what ground is claimed. 
Mr. Newell, who surveyed the Hi Boy claims, stated 
that he had not been on the ground prior to making his 
survey in December, 1958 and January, 1959. He never 
saw any of the original monuments; he relied only on 
self-serving statements of the Aliens that he was sur-
veying in the original corner monuments of the Hi Boy 
claims. As a 1natter of fact the Aliens themselves didn't 
know what the Hi Boy claims looked like. Dean Allen 
said (T. 76) : 
"Q. When you staked out the claims originally, 
you certainly didn't have that-the shape of 
those claims in mind, did you? 
A. We didn't have that in mind, no. 
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Q. Neither did you stake these L-shaped claims 
at that time, did you 1 
A. We didn't know what they were going to look 
like, no. 
Q. Did they look like that~ 
A. vVhen we staked them~ 
Q. Yes. 
A. We didn't know that they would look like 
that. There was no way of telling what they 
would look like. 
Q. So you couldn't tell when you staked these 
claims what they would look like, could you~ 
A. Not at that time. 
Q. Neither could anybody else~ 
A. Unless they was-would survey them, they 
could tell. 
Q. That's the only way they could tell~ 
A. Oh, they could have used a Brunton compass 
of some kind, I guess, and got an idea. 
Q. You, yourself, didn't know what shape they 
were~ 
A. At that time we didn't know the shape." 
Gifford Allen's testimony showed also that he, as 
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-one of the locators, did not know how the claims were 
shaped (T. 226) : 
"Q. When did you find out that these claims were 
L-shaped ~ 
A. We first knew that when Morrill's men were 
there. I was below and Dean and the two 
instrument men were above, and one man was 
going to shoot down and draw me in, and I 
was going to stand at the corner, and he would 
spot those, but they were up and waiting; 
they hollered do\vn; would have to come up 
there or something, and the claims ran off 
this way, (indicating) and so I climbed up. I 
did not go up that time. I didn't go up where 
the road comes. I went over a ways and up 
through, and finally I was able to make it. 
They had to come down and reach me. I had 
a hard time of it. I didn't want to walk over 
that far. 
Q. Until that time, you thought these claims were 
turned around~ 
A. That time we assumed they came over the 
Wingate in the manner that I have drawn. 
Q. And were approximately rectangular~ 
A. What is that~ 
Q. And were approximately rectangular~ 
A. And were-yes." 
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How could anyone be in a position to readily trace 
the Hi Boy monuments when even the Aliens didn't know 
what their claims looked like, and when at the time the 
case went to trial there were three sets of originals on the 
ground as admitted by Paul Allen (T. 255) ~ 
"Q. As a matter of fact, there are three sets now 
of monuments aren't there-the originals~ 
A. I suppose. 
Q. What~ 
A. I guess so, yes." 
Neither did Paul know that the claims they located 
were "L"-shaped (T. 255): 
"Q. vVhen did you first find out that the original 
claims were L-shaped ~ 
A. It was about the time we took those deposi-
tions or just after that; in there sometime. 
Q. It was in December of 1957 ~, 
A. I believe so. 
Q. Or after that~ 
A. Probably around in there sometime." 
If not one of the locators knew the shape of the 
claims, how could the public be expected to know~ The 
statutory requirement was not satisfied. 
(B) FINDING NO. 13 IS ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
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Finding No. 13 made by the trial court reads as fol-
lows: 
"13. The original notice of location for Hi 
Boy No. 1 claim did not contain the name of the 
locator or locators as required by Section 40-1-2, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953." 
Defendants' Exhibit No. 14 is a photograph of the 
notice ( T. 59). However, on cross-examination, Clifford 
Allen reluctantly testified that the notice was signed 
approximately the middle of September, 1957, and when 
pressed further stated that he might not dispute testi-
mony that it was signed after November, 1957 (T. 213). 
The lack of any names of locators on the location no-
tice is in itself fatal to the validity of Hi Boy No. 1. 
Section 40-1-2 U.C.A., 1953 specifically provides that the 
locator at the time of making the discovery must erect a 
monument at the place of discovery and post thereon his 
notice of location which shall contain among other infor-
mation specified, the names of the locator or locators. 
See also title 30, Section 28 U.S.C.A. The case of Jose 
v. Houck, 171 F. (2d) 211 (CCA-9, 1948) dealt with the 
precise problem and held the absence of the names of 
locators on a location notice to be fatal to those claiming 
under it: 
". . . a close scrutiny of one of the posted notices 
of the Hammond Associates-the only exemplar 
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introduced in evidence-fails to disclose thA names 
of the locators. It seems rather more than prob-
able that the absence of the names from the ex-
hibit is not traceable to erasures or weathering, 
but to oversight. The law requires that the names 
of the locators be stated in the notice. 30 TT.S.C.A. 
Sec. 28." 
POINT III. 
THE FAT DOG CLAIMS WERE VALIDLY LOCATED 
PRIOR IN TIME TO ANY HI BOY CLAIMS AND THE 
PLAINTIFFS ARE IN NO POSITION 'TO ATTA.CK THE 
VALIDITY OF THE FAT DOG FRACTIONAL CLAIMS NOS. 
2 AND 3 AND FAT DOG NO.6 CLAIM. 
As already pointed out the conflict in this lawsuit 
involves Fat Dog claims Nos. 4, 5, and 6 and Fat Dog 
Fractional claims Nos. 2 and 3 on the one hand and Hi 
Boy claims Nos. 1, 2, and 3 on the other hand ( T. 4). 
The Fat Dog claims Nos. 4, 5, and 6 were staked on 
the ground :May 17-19, 1954, and on June 17, 1954, the lo-
cation notices for the said claims were filed in the office 
of the County Recorder for San Juan County. 
According to the location notices for the Hi Boy 
claims No. 1, 2, and 3, the same were supposedly staked 
on the ground February 23, 1956, and on March 15, 1956, 
the same were filed in the office of the County Recorder 
for San Juan County. 
On May 9, 1956, Fat Dog claims Nos. 1 to 7 inclusive 
were amended on the ground and on said date Fat Dog 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
Fractions Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were located. On May 10, 1956, 
the amended location notices for Fat Dog claims Nos. 1 
to 7 inclusive and location notices for Fat Dog Fractional 
claims Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were filed in the office of the 
County Recorder for San Juan ·County. 
An affidavit filed August 26, 1957, in the office of the 
County Recorder of San Juan County stated that the 
amended location of Fat Dog No. 6 was in fact an original 
location. The defendants make no claim of a priority 
date for said claim earlier than May, 1956, the date when 
John Shepherd amended the Fat Dog claims on the 
ground and located the fractional claims. 
On January 14, 1959, Hi Boy claims Nos. 1, 2, and 
3 were purportedly amended on the ground and on J anu-
ary 19, 1959, amended notices of location of said Hi Boy 
claims were filed in the office of the County Recorder 
of San Juan County. 
Apparently in Point No. III of their brief the plain-
tiffs are attacking the validity of the amendments made 
by John Shepherd in May, 1956, resulting in the location 
of the above mentioned Fat Dog Fractional claims and 
Fat Dog No. 6 claim. The plaintiffs apparently contend 
that said claims are invalid for want of a discovery of 
mineral. 
It might be noted in passing that while the defend-
ants amended their claims back in 1956, the plaintiffs, 
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were atternpting to amend their Hi Boy Claims in J anu-
ary, 1959, just a few weeks prior to the trial of the case. 
The amending of mining claims is a well recognized 
practice. The locators of mining claims, who frequently 
are practical miners and not equipped with elaborate 
surveying equipment nor trained to use the same, have 
never been expected to go on the ground and locate 
claims in the precise dimensions as allowed by law. There-
fore, after they have located their claims, if it should be 
discovered that any of them do not conform to statutory 
standards, then in conformity with well recognized min-
ing practice the locator may make necessary adjustments 
in his claims. He may reduce their size to appropriate 
dimensions, and the excess area may be staked as frac-
tional claims. 
This is precisely what was done with respect to the 
Fat Dog claims and apparently what the plaintiffs were 
vainly attempting to do to the Hi Boy claims just a few 
weeks before the trial. 
Kenneth L. Franzen testified as to how he and his 
wife had staked out the Fat Dog claims (T. 315-323). 
John C. Shepherd of Grand Junction, Colorado was em-
ployed to survey the Fat Dog claims as originally located 
by Franzen. Shepherd is an engineer and land surveyor 
(T. 258). At the trial his qualifications were conceded by 
counsel for the plaintiffs (T. 258). He prepared the plat 
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from which Exhibit "10" was made (T. 259). He de-
scribed how Exhibit "10" was a "blown up" reproduction 
of the plat he had prepared (T. 279). He stated that he 
went to the area in question in l\1ay of 1956 and found 
the discovery monuments for Fat Dog No. 1 claim (T. 
260); in fact he found all of the discovery monuments for 
Fat Dog claims Nos. 1 through 5 with the original loca-
tion notices in them ( T. 261). He described the system of 
coordinates that he had set up to handle the survey of the 
area (T. 261), and stated that his survey of the Fat Dog 
claims closed within a foot and a half around the entire 
six claims (T. 262), which leaves no doubt as to the ac-
curacy of his survey. He described in detail how he sur-
veyed the Fat Dog ·Claims; made them conform to statu-
tory standards ; and in so doing located the Fat Dog 
Fractional claims (T. 262, 265-268, 272, 273, 290, 291, 295). 
But, the plaintiffs complain that there was a lack of 
discovery on the fractional claims and Fat Dog No. 6 
thus located by Shepherd. So far as the plaintiffs are 
concerned, however, the plain and simple answer to their 
contention is-so what! The plaintiffs having no title, 
possession, or right to possession are in no position to 
rely on any defect, if there be such, in the location of the 
defendants' claims. As already pointed out, they have no 
possession or right thereto and must recover on the 
strength of their own title of which they have none. 
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POINT IV. 
OTHER DEFECTS IN THE ATTEMPTED LOCATION 
OF THE HI BOY CLAIMS. 
(A) THE DISCOVERY MONUMENTS ERECTED FOR 
THE HI BOY CLAIMS WERE INVALID. 
Even the discovery monuments for the Hi Boy claims 
were improper. Gifford Allen admitted that they had no 
discovery at the point where the monuments were ere-cted 
on top of the Wingate cliff (T.192-193). 
"Q. You mentioned too that ordinarily, in fact, 
always, isn't that true, until you laid out Hi 
Boys 1, 2, and 3, you put the discovery monu-
ments at the end of the claim. That is true, is 
it not~ 
A. I believe that is pretty much accurate. There 
could be some-another case. But most all 
cases all our claims ever staked will lay in 
that form. Maybe fifty foot-two feet, but on 
one side. 
Q. But in this case, because you wanted to go 
half over the escarpment and half on the 
Wingate, you placed the discovery monu-
ments in the center of the claims~ 
A. Location, yes, in the center. 
Q. You said, "location." You corrected me. I 
called it a "discovery monument." Was it a 
discovery monument~ 
A. Location monument. Some call it discovery 
monument; some location; I call it both. 
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Q. Was this a discovery monument in each case1 
A. I don't believe there was any ore discovered 
at that monument. No, I don't believe we did 
-ever found anything there at that monu-
ment." 
As a matter of fact there was evidence sufficient to 
have persuaded the court to believe that the plaintiffs 
had never in fact located the Hi-Boy claims as claimed 
at the trial. John Shepherd testified that he had been 
along the escarp1nent of the huge Wingate cliff about 
ten times prior to the year 1957 in search of monuments 
but never saw Hi Boy monuments until November 25, 
1957 ( T. 281), though according to the location notices 
for the Hi Boy claims they had been staked on the ground 
on February 23, 1956. Dean Allen testified that the 
monuments were placed very conspicuously along where 
one would walk on top of the Wingate cliff (T. 258). 
Nevertheless John Shepherd who had frequently been on 
top of the cliff never saw them there until November 25, 
1957 (T. 281). When finally the monun1ents did show up, 
Arthur Flint stated that they were located close to the 
rim along which might be considered a natural walkway. 
They were then readily observable. He first saw them 
August 25, 1957, but contrary to the information con-
tained in the location notices they were not on the ground 
in the year 1956-the year they were supposed to have 
been erected (T. 405). Upon examining the notices con-
tained in the monuments in 1957, it appeared to him that 
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the same were much fresher than the paper in corres-
ponding Fat Dog discovery monuments that had been 
placed therein approximately a year earlier. He could 
still see indentations on the ground adjacent to the Hi 
Boy monument where fragments of rock had been picked 
up to construct the monument although they were sup-
posed to have been erected nearly a year earlier (T. 406). 
(B) THE LOCA'TION NOTICES COVERING THE HI 
BOY CLAIMS FILED FOR RECORD IN THE 
OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF SAN 
JUAN COUNTY ARE INVALID. 
Section 40-1-2 U.C.A. provides that the location 
notice to be prepared by the locator and posted on the 
discovery monuments shall contain among other items 
of information the following: 
" ( 4) If a lode claim, the number of linear feet 
claimed in length along the course of the vein each 
way from the point of discovery, with the width 
claimed on each side of the center of the vein, and 
the general course of the vein or lode as near as 
may be, and such a-description of the claim, 
located by a reference to some natural object or 
permanent mon~tment, as will identify the claim." 
(emphasis added) 
Section 40-1-4, U.C.A., 1953 provides that within 30 
days after the date of posting the location notice upon 
the claim, the locator or locators must file for record in 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
34 
the office of the County Recorder of the County in which 
such claim is situated a substantial copy of such notice 
of location. 
It is fundamental that the description of the where-
abouts of the claim in the notice thereof must be a de-
scription which would enable a person of reasonable in-
telligence to find the claim and trace its boundaries. See 
Vol. 2, Lindley on Mines (3rd Ed.) Sec. 381; Morrison's 
Mining Rights (16th Ed.) page 86; 58 C.J.S., Mtnes and 
Mimer.als, Sec. 51, page 105. 
The case of Levervdge v. Hennessy, 135 P. 906 
(Mont., 1913) deals with this precise question and in-
volves facts very similar to the case at bar. The case 
involved the validity of a claim knovvn as the Speculator. 
The tracing on the following page is taken from page 907 
of the opinion : 
The appellant contended that: 
". . . if the markings of the Speculator as now 
claimed by the respondents are the original mark-
ings upon the ground, then the location was void 
ab initio because of a substantial departure from 
the calls of the declaratory statement. The sub-
joined drawing will illustrate the situation; the 
+ representing the point of discovery; the double 
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line representing the Speculator as now claimed 
by the respondents; the single line representing 
the Speculator as originally marked upon the 
ground, according to appellants; and the broken 
line representing the claim as it would appear if 
in literal conformity to the calls of the declaratory 
statement." 
"Whether the location of the Speculator wa:3 
void must be determined by the only criterion 
upon which it is assailed, viz., a fatal divergence 
between the declaratory statement as filed and 
the markings of the claim upon the ground." 
The court discussed at length the question involving 
the degree of accuracy required by the applicable statute 
in describing the claim in the location certificate. 
"Such a statute, it is true, does not require 
that the declaratory statement contain a descrip-
tion by metes and bonds (Upton v. Larkin, 7 !:font. 
449, 17 Pac. 728; Gmner v. Glenn, 8 Mont. 371, 20 
Pac. 654), but it does require that, taking the dis-
covery as the initial point, the boundaries be 
so definite and certain as that they can be readily 
traced (Hauswirth v. Butcher, 4 Mont. 299, 1 Pac. 
714), and that the declaratory statement contain 
directions which, taken with the markings, will 
enable a person of reasonable intelligence to find 
the claim and runs its lines (1 Lindley on Mines, 
Sec. 381; Gamer v. Glenn, supra; Bramlett v. 
Flick, 23 Mont. 95, 57 Pac. 869). While neither 
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mathematical precision as to measurements nor 
technical accuracy of expression is expected, the 
degree of accuracy that is required is indicated 
by the fact that the locator after his discovery 
had 30 days in which to definitely ascertain the 
course of the vein and mark his boundaries and 
30 days more in which to file his declaratory state-
ment describing his claim so that it could be iden-
tified. Sanders v. Noble, 22 Mont. 110, 55 Pac. 
1037. That degree of accuracy is not met if the 
description given is so erroneous as to be delusive 
and misleading, as when the declaratory statement 
and the markings upon the ground do not even 
approximately agree as to the general shape of 
the claim or as to any point, direction, or distance. 
Dillon v. Bayliss, 11 Mont. 171, 27 Pac. 725." 
The court then discussed the discrepancy existing 
between the description of the Speculator claim as set 
forth in the location certificate and as claimed on the 
ground at the time of the trial, and then employing 
reasoning squarely in point, said, 
"While the sufficiency of the description is 
essentially a question of fact for the jury or for 
the court sitting without a jury (Bramlett v. 
Flick, supra), and while no stress is or can be 
laid upon the mere departure of the lines from the 
cardinal directions since the tract is northerly 
and southerly, yet the description given in the 
declaratory statement does suggest that the claim 
is a parallelogram, all of the angles of which are 
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right angles, and hence that one starting from the 
point of discovery and finding the northern cor-
ners might, by proceeding at right angles to the 
northern line, follow the other lines and pick up 
the other corners. As a matter of fact, if he did so 
proceed he would miss the southeast corner by 
over 800 feet. Furthermore, the record discloses 
that the southerly portion of the claim lies in tim-
ber through which the lines were not 'swamped'; 
that the south line is over 100 feet further from 
the point of discovery and over 432 feet shorter 
than called for; and that the claim as laid out in 
no wise resembles what the declaratory statement 
suggests. In view of all this it is a rational in-
ference that some difficulty might be expected 
in any attempt to find the lines and corners with 
the aid of the declaratory statement, and the 
record shows that as a matter of fact difficulty 
was met, and doubt may be entertained as to 
whether it was wholly surmounted even with the 
aid of the locator who placed the corners. No 
libe_rality of construction will avail to overcome 
such a condition." 
The court's attention is invited to the Utah case of 
Darger v. LeSi,eur, 8 Utah 160, 30 P. 363 (1892), wherein 
the Supreme Court of this state held a location certificate 
insufficient where it failed properly to identify the clain1 
on the ground. 
If the description of the Speculator claim was faulty, 
how much more fatal is the description of the Hi Boy 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38 
claims in this case. Hi Boy monuments were scattered 
all over. The Aliens themselves didn't even know where 
the claims lay and nothing whatsoever would indicate to 
any interested person that the claims were "L"-shaped. 
Examination of Exhibit No. 10-D and the location notices 
for the Hi Boy claims shows a far greater discrepancy 
between the Hi Boy notices and the land actually claimed 
by the Aliens than was the case in Leveridge v. Hennessy 
supra. 
An examination of plaintiffs' Exhibits D, E, and 
F, the notices of location show that the respective Hi Boy 
claims were described as being situated as follows: 
"This claim lies approximately 1 mile North-
erly of Ula Camp in Red Canyon on top of Win-
gate ... " 
Dean Allen testified on direct examination that the 
Hi Boy claims were located "in Red Canyon of San Juan 
County, Utah" (T.12). However, upon cross-examination 
he stated that Red Canyon actually dropped off some 
four miles or so away from where the claims were located. 
An examination of Exhibit "C," a topographic map in-
troduced by the plaintiffs themselves, shows that the 
Hi Boy clatms are not even in Red Canyon. Furthermore, 
the claims were described as being "on top of (the) 
vVingate." The Wingate is a very prominent cliff forma-
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tion several hundred feet high as shown in defendants' 
Exhibits 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11. Any description of claims 
as lying on top of the Wingate would not lead a reason-
able person to conclude that the claims were anywhere 
else than "on top" of the cliff itself. The plaintiffs have 
come into court contending that their claims are both 
on top of and below the cliff formation. The locators 
had a statutory duty to describe in their location notices 
where the claims were located. Having described them 
as being on top of the Wingate when the vVingate forma-
tion is as prominent as it is precludes them from claiming 
that they are elsewhere. Certainly when they arranged 
for Nate Knight to fly over the claims, they themselves 
recognized that if he were to fly at all in the vicinity of 
the claims, it would be necessary to describe them as 
being about 750 feet on top and 750 feet below the cliff 
formation (T. 108). It is therefore apparent that the 
plaintiffs themselves recognized that no reasonable and 
prudent person would be able to fly over the claims un-
less they were described as being on top of and below 
the cliff. Yet when the claims were described in the notice 
of location, they were described as being "on top" of the 
Wingate formation, and certainly the location notices 
preclude any assertion that the claims on the ground 
are L-sha ped. The dimensions shown in the original 
notices allow only for claims in the shape of a rectangle 
or parallelogram. The-re is absolutely nothing whatever 
to indicate angular sidelines. The descriptions required 
to describe claims having angular side lines can be ob-
se-rved in the amended Hi Boy location notices. (Plain-
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tiffs' Exhibits K, L, and l\1) Where the plaintiffs have 
filed location certificates describing claims as (1) being 
in Red Canyon, (2) on top of the Wingate, and (3) in the 
shape of a rectangle or parallelogram, the location certi-
ficate is totally invalid when the claims for which the 
certificates are record notice are (1) not in Red Canyon, 
(2) are not "on top" of the Wingate and (3) are "L"-
shaped. 
(C) 1THE LOCATORS OF THE HI BOY CLAIMS 
NEVER MADE A DISCOVERY OF MINERAL 
IN PLACE ON THE PREMISES COVERED BY 
THE SAID CLAIMS. 
It is a fundamental statutory requirement that there 
must be a discovery of mineral within the limits of any 
claim located if there is to be a valid mining location. 
30, U.S.C.A., Sec. 23 
". . . no location of a m1n1ng claim shall be 
made until the discovery of the vein or lode within 
the limits of the claim located." 
Sec. 40-1-1, U.C.A., 1953 
"No location of the m1n1ng claims shall be 
made until the discovery of the vein or lode within 
the limits of the claim located." 
Without a discovery there can be no rights acquired. 
"Hence, in the mining laws of all civilized 
countries the great consideration for granting 
mines to individuals is discovery. 
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". . . there can be no valid appropriation of 
lode claim unless there has been an antecedent dis-
covery. 'No location of a mining claim shall be 
made until the discovery of the vein or lode within 
the limits of the claim located.' 
* * *'' 
"A location can rest only upon an actual dis-
covery of the vein or lode. 
* * * 
"Discovery of mineral is the initial fact. 
Without that no rights can be acquired. In litiga-
tion arising out of conflicting locations parties 
may stipulate that the lands are mineral lands, 
but this does not dispense with proof of discovery. 
Such discovery must precede the location, or be 
in advance of intervening rights. The proof of 
recording and marking a claim will not authorize 
the court to presume a discovery. 
* * * 
"If no discovery is made until after the acts 
of location have been performed, the location will 
date from the time of discovery." Vol. 2, L~ndley 
on Mines, 3rd Ed., Sec. 335. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has spoken 
on the requirements of discovery. Said the court in Gib-
bons v. Frazier, 68 Utah 182, 2-±9 P. 472. 
"As applied to the location in question, there 
were at least two essential facts required by Rev. 
St. U.S. Sees. 2320, 23:2-± (U.S. Comp. St., Sees. 
4615, 4620), viz : ( 1) The discovery of mineral 
within the claim; and (2) the marking of the loca-
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tion on the ground so that its boundaries may be 
readily traced. Lindley on Mines, Sec. 328. Until 
the requirements of law are complied with, a loca-
tion is not perfected. The decisive question in this 
case is whether the record establishes the fact of 
a valid location of the plaintiffs' mining claim, 
and, if so, as of what time." 
In the recent case of Rttmmell v. BaiJley, 7 Utah (2d) 
137, 320 P. (2d) 653, 656, the Supreme Court of Utah con-
sidered what constituted a valid discovery but made it 
clear that there must be something more than mere traces 
or slight indications of ore. 
"Nor are we disposed to disagree with the au-
thorities to the effect that there must be some-
thing more than mere traces or slight indications 
of ore which might give rise to speculation or con-
jecture that mineral in commercial quantities 
may there exist." 
The requirement of discovery as a prerequisite to a 
valid location is everywhere recognized and thoroughly 
settled. 
Hagan v. Dutton, 181 P. 580 (Ariz., 1919) 
"That discovery of mineral within the limits 
of the mining claim located is a necessary pre-
requisite to a complete and valid mining location 
is thoroughly settled by a long line of decisions. 
The rule is well known to any one at all familiar 
with mining law. 2 Lindley on Mines (3d Ed.) 
par. 335, and cases cited in note." 
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And in a rather recent case the Supreme Court of 
Arizona has reiterated the rule. 
Ponton v. House} 256 P. (2d) 246 (Ariz., 1953) 
"This court pointed out in Brethour v. Clark, 
31 Ariz. 24, 250 P. 254, that 'It is of course the 
law that a mining location is based wholly upon 
a discovery of mineral, and until such discovery 
is made no rights are conferred by the perform-
ance of any of the other steps requisite for loca-
tion. Col. v. Ralph, 252 U.S. 286, 40 S. Ct. 321, 64 
L. Ed. 567; Butte & S. Co. v. Clark-Mont. Co., 
249 U.S. 12, 39 S. Ct. 231, 63 L. Ed. 447; Creede 
[& Cripple Creek etc.] Co. v. Uinta [Tunnel Min. 
etc.] Co., 196 U.S. 337, 25 S. Ct. 266,49 L. Ed. 501' 
and in Zeiger v. Dowdy, 13 Ariz. 331, 114 P. 565, 
566 it was held that 'It is essential to the validity 
of a mining claim that the ground be mineral in 
character, and that a discovery of mineral within 
the confines of the claim be made.' " 
There has been no change in the rule that mere hope 
and expectation of finding ore cannot avail to supplant 
the required disclosure of ore in fact. Antbergris M. Co. 
v. Day, 85 P. 109 (Ida.1906). All the Aliens ever had was 
a speculative hope. No discovery was ever made by them 
on the premises in question. 
The Aliens do claim to have found some copper rock 
in the area covered by the Hi Boy claims (T. 49, 65, 68, 
96, 200, 201). The conclusion that the greenish colored 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
44 
material on the area in question contained copper was 
completely without foundation. Dean Allen had never 
done any copper mining, had no experience as a geologist, 
had never worked with a cornpany that handled copper, 
and was completely lacking in any training that would 
permit him to detect copper mineralization (T. 78). As ~l 
matter of fact, he stated that at the time the claims were 
·located he had no interest in copper (T. 79) and even 
had he in fact seen copper, he stated specifically that he 
didn't seen enough there to cause him to want to pursue 
the recovery of copper (T. 79). It is patently apparent 
that the Aliens, having failed to make any discovery 
whatsoever, are grasping at straws in claiming that their 
observation of greenish colored material on the disputed 
area constituted a discovery. Dean Allen claimed at the 
trial that a person in the employment of the Holly Sugar 
Company had run some tests about six or eight weeks 
before the trial (T. 98). Even if he were telling the truth 
in this regard, it is apparent that the plaintiffs were not 
very excited about the presence of copper, having waited 
nearly five years to have a test made. No evidence what-
soever of the results of this test were produced at the 
trial. If there were such a test the inference is that the 
results were negative. On the other hand, Professor 
Norman C. Williams of the University of Utah testified 
that he had been over the area in question and found no 
indication at all of any copper mineralization (T. 238). 
He did see a greenish colored material which he stated 
was ferric oxide (T. 239). It contained no copper (T. 
239). The testimony of Dr. Williams was confirmed by 
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that of Arthur E. Flint (T. 401) whose qualifications as 
a geologist were admitted by the plaintiffs (T. 398). 
When the claims were allegedly located by the 
Allens, they used neither a ~scintillator nor a geiger 
counter (T. 66, 67). The plaintiff's only basis for claim-
ing discovery on the Hi Boys was the observation of 
greenish colored material on the claims and the allegedly 
significant radiometric readings on an instrument used 
by Nate Knight of Moab, Utah, who testified that he flew 
over the area in question with a machine supposedly 
capable of picking up radiation and detecting the pres-
ence of uranium (T. 102-104). However, on cross ex-
amination he testified that he did not see any of the 
corners to the Hi Boy claims from the air (T. 108); that 
they flew about 100 feet above the ground and 140 miles 
per hour; that even if he had looked for the corners of Hi 
Boy claims he couldn't have seen them (T. 111); that he 
couldn't tell precisely which Hi Boy claim he might have 
been over when he got a reading (T. 112); that as a 
matter of fact, he couldn't be sure that when he got a 
reading that he was even over a Hi Boy claim (T. 112); 
and that when he got a reading he couldn't be positive of 
ore content (T. 110). As a matter of fact, the instrument 
used by Knight was neither a scintillator nor a geiger 
counter, but called, by Mr. Knight, a "hootin-pecker" 
(T. 107), and was torn up and made into an oil finding 
instrument (T. 113). Obviously Mr. Knight made no dis-
covery upon which the plaintiffs can rely. 
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The greenish colored material turning out to be 
something of no significance whatsoever, and the failure 
to establish any discovery of mineral on the claims by 
Nate Knight, leaves the plaintiffs entirely without any 
discovery. The defendants insist that this alone is enough 
to defeat the plaintiffs in this case. The plaintiffs have 
not established a discovery of mineral on one of their 
Hi Boy claims. 
SUMMARY 
The trial court which listened to three days of trial 
of the issues in this case and received extensive briefs 
from the parties concerned and had available a transcript 
of the proceedings, found every issue in this case in 
favor of the defendants. The defendants contend that 
the evidence was sufficient to support all of the findings 
and conclusions made by the trial court. The evidence 
shows conclusively that Fat Dog claims Nos. 3, 4, and 5 
were validly located in May, 1954; that they were prior 
in time to any I-Ii Boy claims; that not one of the Hi Boy 
claims is valid for the reasons enumerated herein; and 
that Fat Dog Fractional claims Nos. 2 and 3 and Fat Dog 
claim No. 6 were validly located in May, 1956. To the 
extent there is any conflict between the Fat Dog Frac-
tional claims Nos. 2 and 3 and Fat Dog claim No. 6 on 
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the one hand and the Hi Boy claims on the other hand, 
the conflict should be resolved in favor of the Fat Dog 
claims again for the reasons that the Hi Boy claims were 
never validly located. 
As for the matter of possession the record is clear 
that the plaintiffs had none nor any right thereto. The 
defendants were in possession; therefore, the plaintiffs 
are in no position to attack the Fat Dog or Fat Dog Frac-
tional claims in any respect. They must prevail on the 
strength of their own title. They have none. 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY AND BURTON and 
MA.COY A.. McMURRAY 
Attorneys for Radium King 
Mines, Inc., a Colorado Corpora-
tion; ffia U rani urn, Inc., a Colo-
rado Corporation, et al. 
720 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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